

# TDK - Team Distributed Koders

## Distributed Systems I

---

# Fairness in P2P Streaming Multicast

Team Members:

*Kumar Keswani*

*John Kaeuper*

*Jason Winnebeck*

Team Report I

1/10/07

---

# Introduction

---


- Overview of P2P multicasting
  - Fairness problem
  - Approach
  - Software to be implemented
-

# Overview

---

- Unicast
  - Point-to-Point
- Broadcast
  - One-to-all
- Multicast
  - One-to-many


■ unicast



■ broadcast



■ multicast




# Overview (continued)

---

- ❑ Most often used for audio and video streaming (e.g. audio/video telecasting)
  - ❑ An alternative to IP Multicast
  - ❑ Peers act as both forwarders and receivers. Bandwidth is distributed from the root publisher.
  - ❑ P2P architecture provides cooperative environment - enhances scalability, improves social welfare, fault tolerance
-

# Overview (continued)

---



- Tree-based architecture often used; streaming content may be striped across multiple trees to balance forwarding load

- With the benefits of a cooperative environment come new problems - cannot assume peers will behave as expected
-

# Problems

---

- ❑ Problem is enforcing fairness in resource sharing
  - ❑ Example: Existence of selfish nodes/freeloader nodes
  - ❑ Definition: selfish/freeloader nodes: nodes that benefit, usually deliberately, from others' information or effort but do not offer anything in return (Wikipedia)
    - Nodes may refuse to accept children
    - Nodes may refuse to forward content to children
-

# Problems (continued)

---

- Asymmetrical bandwidth nodes
    - Many nodes on network can receive more information than they can send.
  - Bit for Bit model does not maximize social welfare because these nodes are not receiving as much as they could
-

# Approach

---

## □ Debt Maintenance

- Each time a parent sends a packet, a debt is accumulated; if debt reaches a threshold, parent refuses service to this child

## □ Ancestor Rating

- If expected packet not received, all ancestors assigned equal blame; similarly, if packet is received, they are all given equal credit
-



# Approach (continued)

---

- Tree Reconstruction
    - periodically, forest trees are rebuilt to identify freeloaders
  - Rebuilding allows reversing of parent-child roles so that debts may be paid off
  - Falsely blamed nodes' ancestor ratings will average out
  - Freeloaders' debt will only continue to accumulate
-

# Approach (continued)

---

- Taxation to increase overall welfare
    - Number of streams a node wishes to receive determines the number of children it must accept
    - In order to receive a higher bitrate stream, a node needs to contribute more resources
      - Bandwidth rich nodes may end up forwarding more than they receive and bandwidth poor nodes may receive more than they forward.
  - Publisher enforces taxation scheme
-


# Software

---

- ❑ Simulate a multicast network following the SplitStream model using a discrete event simulation
  - ❑ Implementation of Ancestor Rating, Debt Maintenance, and Tree Reconstruction
  - ❑ Fairness algorithms will identify freeloaders and the results will allow a comparison of freeloader detection methods
  - ❑ Taxation method will change bandwidth distribution
-

# Software (continued)

- ❑ SplitStream splits the original content from the source into  $k$  stripes, which are multicast using 1 tree per stripe
- ❑ Each node is an interior node in at most 1 tree, and a leaf node in others
- ❑ This balances the forwarding load, so that not all the burden is placed on a small set of interior nodes; it also makes system more fault-tolerant



# References

---

1. Castro, M., Druschel, P., Kermarrec, A., Nandi, A., Rowstron, A., and Singh, A. 2003. SplitStream: high-bandwidth multicast in cooperative environments. In Proceedings of the Nineteenth ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles (Bolton Landing, NY, USA, October 19 - 22, 2003). SOSP '03. ACM Press, New York, NY, 298-313. DOI= <http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/945445.945474>
  2. T. W. J. Ngan, D. S. Wallach, and P. Druschel. Incentives-Compatible Peer-to-Peer Multicast. In The Second Workshop on the Economics of Peer-to-Peer Systems, July 2004. <http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/ngan04incentivescompatible.html>
  3. Chu, Y. 2004. A case for taxation in peer-to-peer streaming broadcast. In Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM Workshop on Practice and theory of incentives in Networked Systems (September 2004). ACM Press, New York, NY, 205-212. DOI= <http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1016527.1016535>
-